






















IOWA APPLIED HISTORY SERIES 

EDITED BY BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH 
VOLUME II NUMBER 7 


Removal of Public 
Officials in Iowa 

BY 

O. K. PATTON 








REPRINTED FROM VOLUME TWO OF THE IOWA 

APPLIED HISTORY SERIES PUBLISHED AT IOWA CITY 

IN 1914 BY THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA 

































REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN IOWA 







IOWA APPLIED HISTORY SERIES 

EDITED BY BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH 


REMOVAL 

OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
IN IOWA 


BY 

0. K. PATTON 


PUBLISHED AT IOWA CITY IOWA IN 1914 BY 
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OP IOWA 























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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 


Efficiency is the key-note of present political pro¬ 
grams: it is the goal of present-day reforms and 
reformers. Moreover, it is clear that efficiency de¬ 
pends as largely upon the personnel of the public 
service as upon the nature of governmental organiza¬ 
tion; and in a democratic government the efficiency 
of the public service depends largely upon the degree 
of responsibility which the people impose upon their 
agents. 

In America short tenures of office and a long list 
of elective officers have not obtained the desired re¬ 
sponsibility ; neither have the old methods of removal 
which provide for dismissal for official misconduct 
materially improved the public service. The time is 
ripe for the discussion of new methods in both the 
selection and the removal of public officials. 

Benj. F. Shambaugh 

Office of the Superintendent and Editor 
The State Historical Society of Iowa 
Iowa City Iowa 


5 








AUTHOR’S PREFACE 


It is the primary purpose of this paper to present the 
various methods of removing public officials from office in 
Iowa. Some attention, however, has been paid to the 
methods of removal found throughout the United States 
— especially the recall. Although this popular instru¬ 
ment has been defined, the writer has not attempted to 
present a brief in favor of the recall: indeed, he has mere¬ 
ly analyzed the existing systems and suggested some of 
the more salient features which should he incorporated 
into such a plan of removal. 

This study emphasizes the methods of removal, rather 
than the history of the legislation involved. And yet, it 
has been found advantageous to discuss the present meth¬ 
ods of removal in Iowa in the light of their past history. 
On the whole it can be said that Iowa has experimented 
with nearly all of the various methods of removal found 
in the United States. 

Acknowledgments are here made to Professor Benj. 
F. Shambaugh, Superintendent of the State Historical 
Society of Iowa, for his many valuable suggestions and 
critical editing of the manuscript. 

0. K. Patton 


The State Historical Society of Iowa 
Iowa City Iowa 


7 




































































































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* 




























































CONTENTS 


I. Introduction : The Problem and Methods of Removal 11 

REMOVAL OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS: REMOVAL BY IM¬ 
PEACHMENT . 12 

REMOVAL OF APPOINTIVE OFFICERS : SUMMARY REMOVAL 14 
REMOVAL OF BOTH ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE OF¬ 
FICERS : REMOVAL FOR CAUSE .... 16 

II. Methods of Removal in Iowa .... 18 

IMPEACHMENT : THE METHOD OF LEGISLATIVE REMOVAL 18 
REMOVAL FOR CAUSE: THE METHOD OF JUDICIAL RE¬ 


MOVAL .20 

The Early Removal Law • • • • 20 

The Cosson Removal Law . ... 24 

Removal Under the Liquor Laws • • • 30 

The Suspension Law 32 

The Whipple Law ..... 34 

Removal by the Governor and Other Agencies . 35 

Removal Under the General Municipal Law . 37 

Removal Under the Civil Service Laws . . 38 

SUMMARY REMOVAL: THE METHOD OF REMOVAL BY 

THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY .... 39 

RECALL: THE METHOD OF REMOVAL BY THE PEOPLE 40 

III. The Recall in the United States ... 41 

THE RECALL DEFINED ..... 41 

THE THEORY OF THE RECALL .... 42 

EXTENSION OF THE STATE-WIDE RECALL . . 44 

ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-WIDE RECALL SYSTEMS . 45 

COMPARISON OF THE IOWA RECALL WITH THE STATE¬ 
WIDE SYSTEMS ...... 51 

IV. Suggestions for a Recall System in Iowa . . 53 

Notes and References ..... 59 


9 












I 


INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND METHODS 
OF REMOVAL 

It is a maxim of representative government that public 
officials should be responsible to their constituents — 
especially in the United States. Indeed, James Bryce 
has said that in the American Commonwealth this prin¬ 
ciple has been carried so far that the agents of the people 
do not consider themselves as representatives but as mere 
delegates. At the same time there are many instances of 
mal administration in American government. Even the 
Fathers were conscious of this possible weakness of 
democracy, and so they provided certain protections 
against the frailties of human nature. To overcome of¬ 
ficial corruption and to insure at all times an ultimate 
control of the legislative, executive, and judicial officers 
they established certain methods of removal, in addition 
to short-term tenures and the control of subordinates 
through the appointing authority. 

The removal of a public official is the act of depriving 
a person of a government office; and it may take place at 
any time within the term for which the official is serving, 
whether his commission be definite or indefinite. The 
removal, however, must be within the term for which the 
person has been chosen: the expiration of a tenure of 
office is not technically a removal. Moreover, this method 
of obtaining control over government agents does not 


11 


12 


APPLIED HISTORY 


involve the violation of any constitutional or legal rights: 
the right to a public office is not a property or a con¬ 
tractual right — indeed it is not an absolute right of any 
kind. In fact, the right to office is merely a privilege. To 
be sure an officeholder may have certain rights: he has the 
legal right to a lawful removal; but that is the only legal 
right which he has in reference to the length of his ser¬ 
vice, although his commission may be for a definite 
period. In the United States the removal of elective and 
appointive officers, and of constitutional and statutory 
officers, has led to several well defined methods of re¬ 
moval. 1 

REMOVAL OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS: REMOVAL BY 
IMPEACHMENT 

Impeachment is not only the oldest, but it is also one 
of the most common plans for dispensing with the ser¬ 
vices of public officers. Although impeachment is used to 
remove appointive as well as elective officers the discus¬ 
sion here is confined for the most part to its use as a 
method of removing elective officers, which is by far the 
more important. Removal by impeachment is a legisla¬ 
tive method of terminating the official relation. It was 
set forth in the Constitution of 1789, and has been estab¬ 
lished in all but one of the American States. In one or 
two of the States the judiciary is combined with the legis¬ 
lature in the impeachment machinery of the Common¬ 
wealth ; but generally speaking, the legislature acts alone 
in this method of removal. 2 

Impeachment has undoubtedly become the common 
machinery for removing elective officers in the United 
States because of the short tenures of office. And yet 
tenure during good behavior and at the pleasure of the 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


13 


appointing authority is not uncommon — especially in 
the Federal government. But in theory the people are 
presumed to make their agents responsible, and thus pro¬ 
tect their interests, by frequent elections. Moreover, the 
soundness of this theory seems to have been borne out in 
the small use that has actually been made of the impeach¬ 
ment process. The number of impeachment cases on 
record is very small when compared with the great army 
of elective and appointive officials, both State and Fed¬ 
eral, who are subject to this process of removal. This is 
not strange, however, when it is remembered that im¬ 
peachment is usually a method of removal for cause, that 
is to say, for corruption or misconduct in office: it is not 
a means of forcing officials to carry out the public will. 
Impeachment deals with the delinquent official as the 
criminal law deals with the delinquent member of society. 

The Federal Constitution provides for the impeach¬ 
ment of the President, the Vice President, and all “ civil 
officers” of the United States for treason, bribery, and 
‘ ‘ other high crimes and misdemeanors ’ ’. 3 The provisions 
in the State constitutions vary considerably, but most of 
them provide for the impeachment of all 4 ‘civil officers”. 
Some, however, limit this method of removal to executive 
officers only. The exact meaning of “civil officers” has 
never been fully determined. It is doubtful whether leg¬ 
islative officials are ‘ 4 civil officers”. William Blount, 
Senator from Tennessee, was impeached in 1798, but the 
case was not decisive on this point. In regard to the 
grounds for impeachment in the States, it can be said that 
crime is the most general cause, although immorality, 
official corruption, and misconduct are common, while in¬ 
competence, incapacity, neglect of official duty, and favor¬ 
itism are sufficient in some of the States. In every State 


14 


APPLIED HISTORY 


but Nebraska, the lower house of the legislature prefers 
the charges of impeachment, usually by a majority vote. 
With the exception of Nebraska and New York, the upper 
house of the legislature tries the charges of impeachment 
as a court. A two-thirds vote is usually required for a 
conviction. In New York the Court of Appeals joins with 
the upper house as a court of impeachment. In Nebraska 
the Supreme Court tries the charges alone; and there the 
charges are preferred by the legislature in joint session. 4 

In the Federal government charges of impeachment 
are preferred and tried on the same plan as in the States. 
In cases involving the President, however, the Chief Jus¬ 
tice of the Supreme Court presides over the Senate as a 
court of impeachment. Conviction at an impeachment 
trial not only removes the accused from office but it 
usually disqualifies him for public service in the future, 
as well as subjecting him to ordinary indictment and 
criminal prosecution. 5 

REMOVAL OF APPOINTIVE OFFICERS: SUMMARY REMOVAL 

Although appointive officers are usually subject to re¬ 
moval by impeachment, they have been more effectively 
controlled by summary removal. Summary removal — 
that is, removable without cause or dismissal at the dis¬ 
cretion of the appointing authority — may be used when 
the tenure is at the pleasure of the appointing authority 
either by formal discharge or by the appointment of a 
successor to the incumbent. In both the State and Fed¬ 
eral governments the power of removal is an incident of 
the appointing power; while in the Federal government 
it is also an incident of the executive power. 6 

The Federal Constitution does not specifically confer 
the power of summary removal upon any officer or body; 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


15 


but the First Congress of the United States decided, by 
the vote of the Vice President in the Senate, that this 
power was an incident of the executive authority. That 
interpretation became the rule of construction for nearly 
three-quarters of a century. The tenure of office acts 
(1867-1869), however, placed a limitation upon this re¬ 
moval power of the President. Those acts made the 
consent of the Senate necessary in the removal of certain 
officials — officials who had been appointed with the con¬ 
sent of the Senate. For twenty years the tenure of office 
acts remained upon the statute books of Congress, not¬ 
withstanding the fact that there was always great un¬ 
certainty as to their meaning. They were repealed in 
1887, when the early interpretation of the executive au¬ 
thority again became the rule of construction. This view 
of the executive power has in recent years been upheld by 
the Supreme Court of the United States; so that now the 
President of the United States is to be viewed as having 
the power of summary removal as a part of his executive 
authority. In fact, at the present time all civil officers ap¬ 
pointed by the President, or by the President and the 
Senate, are removed by the President on his own initi¬ 
ative. Moreover, all officers appointed by the President’s 
subordinates are subject to removal by him, and they may 
also be removed by the officer appointing them. 7 

Such an extensive power of summary removal is not, 
however, enjoyed by the Governors in the various States. 
The chief executives in the Commonwealths do not have 
this power as an incident of the executive authority. 
They do not even possess it as a part of their appointing 
power where the term of office is prescribed by the stat¬ 
utes or the Constitution, unless such power is expressly 
conferred upon them. In fact what real power of removal 


16 


APPLIED HISTORY 


they exercise is for the most part the result of expressed 
provisions in the laws of the State. Summary removal, 
then, has not been used to any great extent in controlling 
State officials. The use of this form of removal in the 
Federal government, where it has been most effective, 
has sometimes led to abuses. 8 

EEMOVAL OF BOTH ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE OFFICEES: 

EEMOVAL FOE CAUSE 

In addition to removal by impeachment and summary 
removal, removal for cause is also common in the United 
States. That is to say, there is another distinct method 
of removal for cause other than by impeachment; it ap¬ 
plies to both elective and appointive officers and is the 
one universal method of removal in Commonwealth gov¬ 
ernment. In theory this is a method of removal by ju¬ 
dicial process, wherein a hearing is given and conviction 
is had for specific charges. But the trial does not neces¬ 
sarily have to be before a court: the proceedings are 
merely according to the forms of law. The hearing may 
be before an executive officer or board. Neither is it 
always necessary to prove the charges, except in the case 
of officers appointed under the civil service; and so an 
official may be removed from office for cause without 
proof of the accusations. In some systems the official is 
not even given an opportunity to present his side of the 
case. In these instances the cause of removal is simply 
made a matter of public record. 9 

Moreover, an examination of the various statutes and 
constitutions of the States shows great variation in the 
method of removal for cause other than by impeachment. 
In about half of the States judges may be removed with¬ 
out going through the impeachment process. About six- 





REMOVAL OP PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


17 


teen of the States provide for such removal by joint 
resolution of the legislature; while in a number of others 
the Governor and legislature act together. The Governor 
of Michigan has power to remove all the important State 
officials for misconduct or neglect of duty. The legis¬ 
lature in some of the other States has the same power by 
joint resolution. In New York the Governor has the 
power to remove the important State officers with the 
consent of the Senate. He also has large powers in re¬ 
moving local officers — sheriffs, district attorneys, and 
mayors. A few other chief executives have a similar 
power over local officials. 10 


2 


II 

METHODS OF REMOVAL IN IOWA 


When the delegates elected by the pioneers met in the 
Old Stone Capitol at Iowa City in 1844 to draft a consti¬ 
tution under which the Territory of Iowa was to seek 
admission to the Union, they were conscious of the neces¬ 
sities of a responsible government. To guide them in 
their deliberations they had the plans and experiences of 
other Territories and the States as well as of the Federal 
government. 

IMPEACHMENT: THE METHOD OF LEGISLATIVE REMOVAL 

The members of the constitutional convention of 1844 
chose impeachment — the legislative method of removing 
public officials — as a feature of their plan for responsible 
government. They not only adopted this formal legis¬ 
lative method of removal, but their plan also conferred 
upon the General Assembly the power to enact laws cre¬ 
ating removal machinery for all other civil officers of the 
State. Although these schemes of establishing an ulti¬ 
mate control of public officials were rejected along with 
the rest of the Constitution of 1844, the constitutional 
convention of 1846 reincorporated, almost word for word, 
the same provisions in the proposed constitution of that 
year, and by the vote of the people impeachment became 
the first legal method of dispensing with the services of a 
delinquent official in the State of Iowa. 11 This impeach¬ 
ment clause reads as follows: 


18 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


19 


The Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, and 
Judges of the Supreme and District Courts, shall be liable to 
impeachment for any misdemeanor in office . 12 

When the Constitution of 1857 was drafted a slight 
change was made in the wording of the impeachment 
clause. The present impeachment law as found in that 
instrument reads as follows: 

The Governor, Judges of the Supreme and District Courts, 
and other State officers, shall be liable to impeachment for any 
misdemeanor or malfeasance in office . 13 

In an opinion of the Attorney General rendered in 
1909 the following construction was placed upon the 
present impeachment law: 

The term “other state officers’’ as used in ... . the 

constitution, who may be removed by impeachment proceedings, 
refers only to the state officers named or provided for in the 
constitution, and does not cover incumbents of state offices which 
have been created by statute . 14 

Under the Constitution of 1857 it is apparent that the 
only officers subject to impeachment in Iowa at the pres¬ 
ent time are the Governor, the Secretary of State, the 
Auditor of State, the Treasurer of State, the Attorney 
General, and the Judges of the Supreme and District 
Courts. It is doubtful whether members of the legisla¬ 
ture can be removed by impeachment since the Constitu¬ 
tion vests in each house the power to expel its own 
members and to punish them for disorderly behavior. 15 

The machinery of impeachment in Iowa is the same as 
that usually found in the States. The lower house pre¬ 
fers the charges of impeachment and the upper house 
tries them. 16 The details of procedure have been pro¬ 
vided by statute and are found in Chapter 33 of Title 25 


20 


APPLIED HISTORY 


of the Code of 1897. There has never been hut one im¬ 
portant impeachment trial in Iowa, namely, the case of 
John L. Brown, Auditor of State. The record of this 
trial includes three large printed volumes. In actual 
practice the method of removal by impeachment has 
never been useful or effective in Iowa. 

REMOVAL FOR CAUSE: THE METHOD OF JUDICIAL REMOVAL 

In the Federal government more officers are subject to 
summary removal than to either impeachment or removal 
for cause; but in Iowa the reverse is true. Removal 
for cause is not only the most common method of dis¬ 
pensing with the services of an unsatisfactory official in 
Iowa, but it has also been the most effective. Removals 
for cause are generally treated as judicial processes, and 
are in theory conducted according to the forms of law. 
Usually these proceedings are not conducted in a court 
but by an executive officer or board. In Iowa, however, 
advantage was taken, at an early date, of the court ma¬ 
chinery in removals for cause. So that in this juris¬ 
diction there are at the present time two different 
methods of making removals for cause: (1) by judicial 
process, and (2) by executive order. 

The Early Removal Law. — The Constitutions of 
1846 and 1857 besides providing for removal by im¬ 
peachment gave the legislature the power to provide 
methods of removing officials not subject to impeachment. 
This the legislature has done. The first general removal 
law passed by the General Assembly appears as Chapter 
31 in the Code of 1851. In this chapter of the Code pro¬ 
vision was made for the removal of all county officers — 
including justices of the peace — upon charges being pre- 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


21 


ferred and proof made in the district court for seven 
causes: (1) habitual or wilful neglect of duty, (2) gross 
partiality, (3) oppression, (4) extortion, (5) corruption, 
(6) wilful mal-administration in office, or (7) conviction 
of a felony. 17 

Under the provisions of the Code of 1851 any person 
could prefer charges against an officer, and the district 
court had original jurisdiction of the case. The method 
of procedure was for the most part the same as in other 
civil actions. The accuser filed against the accused a com¬ 
plaint, which contained the charges. This pleading had 
to be verified by an affidavit of an elector of the State to 
the effect that he believed the charges to be true. Then 
came the officer’s turn in court; and he could file an 
answer, demurrer, or motion. Thereupon the accuser 
might reply, if the officer answered, as in other actions. 18 

The trial was by jury, and when the verdict was 
“guilty” judgment was entered removing the officer from 
his position and declaring the office vacant. The party 
against whom the judgment was entered was liable for 
the costs. In cases where the trial was continued from 
one term of court to another, the judge might suspend the 
officer if the evidence warranted. In such cases provision 
was made for the appointment of a temporary successor. 
Furthermore, as a part of this system, the judges of the 
district court were given power to suspend the clerk and 
sheriff on their own motion for any of the above enumer¬ 
ated causes. 19 

Moreover, the removal law of the Code of 1851, with 
certain changes and alterations, remains the law to¬ 
day. The Revision of 1860 retained this law, with the 
exception of making it conform to the changes which had 
taken place in local government organizations. 20 The 


22 


APPLIED HISTORY 


adoption of the Code of 1873 merely brought about an 
extension in the scope of the removal provisions-—all 
county and township officers being brought under the 
system, together with the clerk of the circuit court. An 
additional ground for removal was also incorporated, 
namely, failure “to produce and fully account for all 
public funds and property” in the hands of an officer at 
any suspension or settlement. At the same time the pro¬ 
cedure was also made to conform more nearly to that of 
actions at law. 21 

The Code of 1897 extended the scope of the removal 
law still further; for under its provisions all county, 
township, city, and town officers, elected or appointed, 
are subject to removal by the district court for cause. 
Two additional grounds for removal were added by the 
Code of 1897: (1) disability preventing a proper dis¬ 
charge of official duties, and (2) wilful misconduct. 
These two new causes, together with the old causes — 
habitual or wilful neglect of duty, gross partiality, op¬ 
pression, extortion, corruption, conviction of a felony, 
and failure to make an account — bring the number of 
grounds for removal up to nine. 22 

The grounds for removal have also been broadened in 
recent years by judicial construction. In the case of the 
State v. Welsh the Supreme Court held that “voluntary 
intoxication while engaged in the performance of an of¬ 
ficial duty” 23 is wilful misconduct and subjects the 
officer to removal; also, that misconduct during a pre¬ 
ceding term is a ground for removal under the statute 
when the officer succeeds himself. In a more recent de¬ 
cision, however, the court has in another way limited the 
scope of the law as the following statement of the case of 
State v. Meek clearly shows: 


REMOVAL OP PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


23 


The term wilful misconduct in office, as used in the statute 
providing that any county officer may be removed for wilful mis¬ 
conduct or maladministration in office, is not applicable to every 
case of misconduct, nor to every mistake or departure from the 
strict letter of the law; but only to wilful wrongs, or omissions on 
the part of such officer. So that the question of the good faith 
and innocence of intentional wrong becomes important. 24 

In addition to the above changes the Code of 1897 en¬ 
tirely reorganized the procedure in removal cases. By 
the present method any resident of the local area in which 
the delinquent officer is an official may make complaint 
against him by way of petition in the district court in the 
name of the State, setting forth the charges — any one or 
two of which may he united, but specifications are neces¬ 
sary under each charge. After the petition is filed it can 
be amended as in other actions. The name of the accused 
and accuser must be stated as provided in the earlier 
form. 25 

It is also mandatory upon the county attorney to file 
a petition when he believes there is just cause for an 
action; and he can he compelled by the court to file such a 
petition in cases where the judge has suspended a court 
official from office. 26 According to an opinion of the At¬ 
torney General in 1907 the statutes of this State 6 ‘ author¬ 
ize the attorney-general to appear and prosecute any 
action brought in the name of the state for the removal of 
. . . . officers when the county attorney refuses to 

prosecute for malfeasance or non-feasance in office”. 27 
Thus, in cases where the county attorney is negligent or 
indifferent the people have redress through the State 
Department of Justice. 

When, however, the petition is filed by a private citi¬ 
zen it has to be verified, and the accuser must also file a 


24 


APPLIED HISTORY 


bond for the costs with sureties approved by the clerk of 
the courts. The original notice in these cases requires 
the accused to appear and answer a petition charging him 
with 4 ‘ official misdemeanors ’ ’. The charges are tried as 
in a law action, the costs being taxes against the losing 
party. Although they are never taxed against the county 
attorney, the court may in any case charge the costs to the 
State. Trial is by jury and a verdict of ‘ 6 guilty ” or “ not 
guilty’’ is found. When the verdict is “guilty” a judg¬ 
ment of removal is entered immediately. Either party 
can appeal the case to the Supreme Court under the same 
limitations as in other law actions. 28 

The Code of 1897 provides, also, for the removal of 
councilmen, marshals, police matrons, and other munic¬ 
ipal officials by the city council for the above mentioned 
causes or upon being charged with the commission of a 
crime. This process, however, is to be considered as a 
method of removal by judicial proceedings, for under the 
plan the council really sits as a court and has the powers 
of a court for the purposes of trying the case. The coun¬ 
cil, however, is given power to provide for the details of 
the procedure by ordinance. The charges are preferred 
in writing to the council. A hearing is then held and if 
two-thirds of all the members elected to the council are in 
favor of removal, the effect is the same as if the action 
was brought in the district court. 29 

Such, briefly, was the development of the law of re¬ 
moval for cause by judicial process down to 1909 when 
the so-called “Cosson Removal Law” was enacted. 

The Cosson Removal Law .— The Cosson Law which 
was enacted by the General Assembly in 1909 provides 
for the removal of certain officers for misfeasance, mal- 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


25 


feasance, or nonfeasance: it is additional to the early 
removal law just discussed. The basis of the Cosson Law 
is found in the report of Attorney General Byers to the 
Governor in 1909. This report resulted in the recom¬ 
mendation by Governor Garst to the Thirty-third General 
Assembly that the legislature pass some kind of an act 
which would centralize more effectively the law-enforcing 
agencies of the State. Mr. Cosson, who was then a mem¬ 
ber of the upper house of the legislature, introduced a 
bill which resulted in what is popularly known as the 
“Cosson Removal Law”. The original bill provided for 
removal by the Governor; but by the time it had run the 
gauntlet of the General Assembly, the old method of trial 
in the district court had been substituted for trial by the 
Governor. The original idea, evidently, was to centralize 
administration, as far as law enforcement was concerned, 
in the hands of the Governor. The law as finally passed, 
however, with subsequent amendments, provides for the 
removal of any county attorney, sheriff, supervisor, 
mayor, police officer, marshal, or constable by the district 
court upon conviction of (1) wilful or habitual neglect or 
refusal to perform official duties, (2) wilful misconduct 
or mal-administration in office, (3) corruption, (4) extor¬ 
tion, (5) conviction of a felony, or (6) intoxication or 
conviction of being intoxicated. 30 

It is apparent that the Cosson Law has not added 
much to the old removal law, except that it gives the At¬ 
torney General the power upon his own initiative, and it 
compels him upon the order of the Governor, to go into 
the local area and enforce these new provisions. Former¬ 
ly, enforcement was left almost entirely in the hands of 
citizens and local officers — although, as has already been 
seen, the Attorney General could prosecute where the 


26 


APPLIED HISTORY 


county attorney refused to do so in those cases where a 
petition had been filed by a citizen of the local area. It is 
true that the Cosson Law adds a new ground of removal 
— the cause of intoxication. But the officers mentioned in 
the act could be removed for the other five causes enumer¬ 
ated under the old law; and, as a matter of fact, the 
Supreme Court had prior to this time held intoxication 
while on duty to be misconduct in office subjecting the 
offender to removal. 31 The distinction between intoxica¬ 
tion under the old law and under the Cosson Law was 
drawn by Judge Howell, of the eighth judicial district, in 
a case against a justice of the peace when he said: 

The Cosson Law mentions intoxication as a specific ground 
for removal, but the general removal statute only says “wilful 
misconduct or maladministration in office ’ ’. The Supreme Court 
in State v. Welsh held that intoxication while engaged in the 
performance of duties was wilful misconduct and grounds for 
removal . 32 

Attorney General Cosson was reported as being op¬ 
posed to this distinction because of a recent case under 
the Cosson Law of removal for intoxication where the 
court held that it was not necessary to plead and prove 
official as distinguished from private misconduct. 33 If 
this construction applies to the general removal law as 
well as to the Cosson Law and thereby reverses the de¬ 
cision in State v. Welsh, then the Cosson Law has not 
added anything new as far as causes are concerned. Had 
the original bill been passed, however, a different situ¬ 
ation would exist — removal by executive order would 
take the place of removal by judicial process. But this 
much is to be said for the Cosson Law that for those cases 
arising under it the method of trial has been changed 
from that of an action at law to that of an action in 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


27 


equity. That is to say, trial by jury has been dispensed 
with and trial by the judge alone inaugurated in its 
place. 34 

There are many other interesting details of the Cos- 
son Law which might be considered if space permitted, 
but the most important variations from the general re¬ 
moval law have been noted. It is evident that there is 
great similarity in the provisions of the two laws. The 
principal thing to be remembered is that the Cosson Law 
gives the Governor power through the Attorney General 
to start proceedings against a local official. Indeed, it 
makes it the duty of the Governor, whenever he has 
knowledge of the existence of reasonable grounds for re¬ 
moval to direct the Attorney General to file a petition 
against the officer; so that under this law, petitions may 
be filed in the district court by private citizens, by the 
county attorney, and by the Attorney General on his own 
behalf or upon behalf of the Governor. In this way the 
original ideas of Attorney General Byers, Governor 
Garst, and Senator Cosson concerning the centralization 
of the law-enforcing agencies of the State, have been in¬ 
corporated into the removal law of Iowa. 

The Cosson Law became operative in March, 1909. 
'Two years later Attorney General Byers in his biennial 
report of 1911 said that the law was “the cap-sheaf of 
this whole system of law enforcement laws, and under it 
seed has been sown that will ripen into a glorious harvest 
for obedience to law, for morality and for decency and 
efficiency in public office.” 35 

The first action under the law took place almost imme¬ 
diately. The case involved the removal of the mayor of 
Marengo for intoxication. Accompanying the complaint 


28 


APPLIED HISTORY 


were the affidavits of numerous citizens of Marengo 
charging the mayor with intoxication. The action was 
instituted by the county attorney with the advice and 
assistance of the Attorney General, and the case was tried 
and submitted to Judge Preston of the sixth district. 
Substantially every allegation of the petition was found 
by the court to be true. An order of removal was made. 
The case was then appealed and the constitutionality of 
the law assailed upon every imaginable ground. After 
able and full argument by counsel for the mayor, the law 
was upheld by the Supreme Court. 36 Commenting upon 
this decision the Attorney General said: “For the first 
time in Iowa notice was served that in this state the dig¬ 
nity and efficiency required in the public service demand¬ 
ed sober men.” 37 

The next case was against the chief of police in Coun¬ 
cil Bluffs. Complaint was filed with the Attorney General 
by five of the leading business and professional men of 
the city. The Department of Justice sent a special rep¬ 
resentative to investigate the case. His report was of 
such a character that a petition was immediately filed 
charging the chief of police with failure to enforce the 
laws of the State in regard to saloons, gambling, and 
prostitution. The most desperate and persistent effort 
was made to prevent the removal of this officer, but he 
was found guilty of the charges and dismissed from office. 
Following this removal came a case from Ottumwa, which 
was started by the Governor through the Attorney Gen¬ 
eral^ office. The mayor was removed for intoxication 
and failure to perform the duties of his office. 38 

According to the Attorney General’s report in 1911 
there were three other cases commenced during the bi¬ 
ennial period: one at Kellogg against the mayor for in- 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


29 


toxication (the mayor resigned before the hearing was 
had); one in Sioux County against the county attorney, 
brought by local parties contrary to the judgment of the 
Attorney General (the county attorney was vindicated); 
and one in Union County against a marshal (there were 
no substantial grounds for removal). 39 In regard to the 
general effect of these prosecutions the following lan¬ 
guage of the Attorney General is noteworthy: 

Prior to the prosecutions by this department of the cases at 
Marengo, Council Bluffs and Ottumwa we were receiving almost 
daily complaints from some of the cities charging misconduct to 
local officers. Since these trials, as I now remember it, we have 
not had a single complaint from the cities, not even the so-called 
river cities, and I am sure that the conditions that existed in 
Council Bluffs, and other cities of Iowa, prior to the trial of the 
Richmond case cannot now be found to exist in a single city in 
this state. 

All this has been brought about under the removal law with¬ 
out harm to any innocent man or legitimate business; surely no 
good citizen anywhere with knowledge will lend further respecta¬ 
bility to the effort that is being made in some quarters to dis¬ 
credit it . 40 

During the biennial period from 1911 to 1913 not so 
many prosecutions took place under the Cosson Law as 
during the first two years of its existence. A number of 
proceedings for removal were brought against members 
of boards of supervisors for “wrongful use of road 
and bridge funds and maladministration in office’ \ 41 The 
Department of Justice spent a great deal of time in the 
preparation of these cases. Cooperation was had with 
the State Highway Commission, and the services of an 
expert engineer, Professor Byron J. Lambert of the Col¬ 
lege of Applied Science of the State University of Iowa, 


30 


APPLIED HISTORY 


were used. Other expert testimony was also arranged 
for. In fact so thorough was the preparation of these 
cases that all of the accused officers resigned and a large 
amount of money was turned back into the county treas¬ 
uries. One county alone recovered $25,000 of misappro¬ 
priated funds. 42 

The last case of removal under the Cosson Law was 
that of the mayor of Harlan, who was charged with mis¬ 
conduct, maladministration in office, neglect and refusal 
to perform his official duties, and intoxication. He was 
found guilty of the charges and removed from office. 43 

From this review of the prosecutions under the Cos- 
son Law, it is apparent that this method of removal has 
been successful in practice and has had many beneficial 
results. To be sure, its success has been due largely to 
the attitude and energy of the Attorney General, and its 
operation in the future will depend largely upon the atti¬ 
tude of the Governor and the continued activity of the 
Attorney General. Without alert interest and enforce¬ 
ment from the central authorities it will in time degener¬ 
ate into a mere paper provision as has been the case with 
the old removal law. 

Removal Under the Liquor Laws .— The legislature of 
Iowa has not been content to enact merely general laws 
for the removal of delinquent officials, but it has in certain 
instances seen fit to add other special methods of removal. 
Perhaps the most interesting special provision of this 
kind is the one found in the liquor regulations of the 
State. 

Iowa has had a varied and unique experience in its 
attempts to suppress the liquor traffic. In fact the liquor 
problem has been interwoven in political affairs in this 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


31 


State for so long that no campaign or election since the 
Civil War can be fully understood without a study of its 
influence. As a result of these experiences a system of 
removal has been evolved in the liquor law itself. Only a 
brief account of this development is here attempted. 

The general liquor regulations of the Code of 1851 do 
not include any special method of removing officials for 
failure to enforce the law, 44 but by an amendment which 
was added in 1857, 45 it was made the duty of every peace 
officer to see that the law was enforced, and when in¬ 
formed that the law had been violated, or when he had 
reason to believe that it had been violated and proof could 
be obtained, he was required to go before a magistrate 
and file information against the violator. He was then 
compelled to institute a suit and proceed to arrest and 
trial according to law. At the trial it was the duty of the 
prosecuting attorney to appear for the State. A failure 
of the peace officer, in these matters, subjected him to a 
conviction of a misdemeanor, with a fine penalty of not 
less than ten nor more than fifty dollars. Moreover, such 
a conviction worked as a forfeiture of his office. 

This section remains as a part of the law of to-day; it 
is criminal in its nature, and the peace officer who fails to 
comply with its provisions is proceeded against as in any 
other criminal action. 46 Under the present Code peace 
officers are designated as (1) sheriffs and their deputies, 
(2) constables, and (3) marshals and policemen of cities 
and towns. 47 

In addition to this removal provision there is also 
another special method in the so-called Mulct Law. When 
the Twenty-fifth General Assembly passed this regulative 
measure, it made it the duty of the county attorney to 
enforce the law and subjected him to suspension or re- 


32 


APPLIED HISTORY 


moval from office by the judge of the district court for 
failure to do so. Removal, under this section, is to take 
place either for wilful or negligent conduct on the part of 
the county attorney. The suspension or removal can be 
made upon application of any citizen residing in the 
county, but no suspension or removal can take place ex¬ 
cept on due notice to the officer and trial in court. The 
same conditions are also extended to assessors, county 
treasurers, members of boards of supervisors — all of 
whom have certain duties in the enforcement of the Mulct 
Law. 48 

The Mulct Law “is currently supposed to give the 
judges of the various districts authority to summarily 
suspend or remove from office any county attorney who 
neglects or refuses to enforce .... the mulct 
law”; 49 but such is not the case, for this is a method of 
removal for cause. As to whether failure to enforce the 
general provisions or only those relating to the tax fea¬ 
tures of the law will subject the officials named in the act 
to removal is a question which has never been decided. 50 

The Suspension Law .— In addition to enacting re¬ 
moval laws for local officials, the General Assembly 
has also provided for a system of suspension of State 
officers by executive order. A suspension is not, strictly 
speaking, a removal: it is not even a temporary removal, 
for the suspended official is still an officer — otherwise, 
such legislation would be unconstitutional as to officers 
whose election and term of office are fixed by the consti¬ 
tution. 51 Although this is true, suspension of officials is 
properly treated as a phase of removal. Moreover, it has 
already been observed that in the case of removal for 
cause the statutes in some instances confer the power of 
suspension during the removal proceedings. 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


33 


The suspension act above referred to was passed in 
1858; with certain modifications it comprises one of the 
chapters of the present Code. By this act the Governor 
of the State was authorized and compelled to appoint a 
commission of three competent accountants to examine 
and inspect the books, papers, vouchers, moneys, securi¬ 
ties, and other documents under the control of any execu¬ 
tive officer. During its sessions the commission had 
authority to subpoena witnesses and exercise other ju¬ 
dicial powers. They received for their services three 
dollars a day while actually employed in the performance 
of their duty; and they w^ere to make a full report to the 
Governor by June 1,1858. 52 

In addition to this special provision, it was also made 
a duty of the Governor to appoint such a commission in 
June of every year, and at other times when in his judg¬ 
ment the public service required it. When any of these 
commissions reported defalcation, misapplication, or mis¬ 
appropriation of public money, or that the accounts, pa¬ 
pers, and books were improperly kept, it became the duty 
of the Governor to suspend the officer from the exercise 
of all of the functions of his office and require him to 
deliver all the property of the State to the Governor. He 
was also required to fill the office for the time being by the 
appointment of another person. 53 

In case of suspension from office by the Governor, 
under these provisions, an attempt on the part of the of¬ 
ficial to discharge any official duty was made a misde¬ 
meanor and subjected the officer to imprisonment for not 
more than one year in the county jail and to a fine of not 
more than $1000. Furthermore, any person dealing with 
a suspended officer in his official capacity made himself 
liable to a fine of not less than $500 or more than $5000. 54 


3 


34 


APPLIED HISTORY 


The suspension law of 1858 was not changed until the 
adoption of the Code of 1873. In the Revision of 1860 the 
suspension law appears as a part of the chapter dealing 
with the duties of the Governor. By the Code of 1873 the 
Governor was no longer required to appoint a committee 
every year to go over the accounts of each State officer, 
but he might still do so at his discretion. Under this plan 
a person dealing with a suspended officer in his official 
capacity was not liable to fine or imprisonment. The 
commissioners who did the codifying in 1873 thought such 
a provision needless since all i ‘ such acts would be simply 
void, and of no effect without the penalty.’’ The sus¬ 
pended officer, however, still remained subject to both 
penalties. With these and a few additional alterations 
the suspension law was incorporated into the Code of 1897 
and is the law as it stands to-day. 65 There has never 
been but one important suspension case under this law 
and that was the case of John L. Brown, Auditor of 
State, who was later impeached by the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives. 

The Whipple Law .— In 1909 a controversy arose be¬ 
tween Governor Carroll and Pharmacy Commissioner 
B. F. Keltz. Out of this affair grew the so-called “Whip¬ 
ple Law”, which provides for a real removal by executive 
order. In an opinion given by Attorney General Byers at 
this time there were a large number of State officials who 
were not subject to any form of removal. As a result of 
this opinion the Governor sent a special message, on 
March 31, 1909, to the Thirty-third General Assembly, 
which was then in session, calling attention to this “over¬ 
sight by the Legislature” and asking for legislation cov¬ 
ering the deficiencies in the law, stating that he believed 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


35 


“the interests of good government” and public service 
demanded “that some legislation be enacted . . . . 

making some provision whereby, when just cause exists ’ 9 
the delinquent official can be removed. 56 

In response to this appeal of the Governor the Thirty- 
third General Assembly passed the Whipple Law, which 
is an amendment to the general removal law discussed 
above. It really extends the scope of the old law to a 
large number of appointive State officials and substitutes 
an executive order for a judicial process as the machinery 
of removal, so that instead of removal by the court the 
power of removal is now placed in the hands of the Ex¬ 
ecutive Council, although they are presumed to conduct a 
trial according to the forms of law. 57 Not only were the 
State officers mentioned by Attorney General Byers as 
being unremovable provided for in the act, but a number 
of other appointive officers were also brought under its 
provisions — although provision then existed in the law 
for their removal. These additions were made by the 
legislature itself, as the original bill when introduced by 
Senator Whipple included only those officers mentioned 
by the Attorney General. 58 This is the case with the fol¬ 
lowing State officers: oil inspectors, custodian of public 
buildings, inspector of passenger boats, dairy commis¬ 
sioner, and veterinary surgeon. As to whether the ex¬ 
tension of the Whipple Law to these mentioned officers 
repeals the previous method of removal for them has not 
been decided by the Supreme Court, but by the ordinary 
rules of constitutional construction it would seem that the 
old methods have been repealed by implication. 

Removal by the Governor and Other Agencies .— The 
Suspension Law and the Whipple Law are not the only 


36 


APPLIED HISTORY 


methods of dealing with delinquent officials by executive 
order. The Governor and certain governmental bodies of 
the State have also been vested with considerable power 
of removal for cause. This power is not found in the 
Constitution nor in any general provision of the legisla¬ 
ture : it is found in a number of individual acts creating 
administrative offices, boards, and commissions. Some¬ 
times the power is exercised by the Governor alone, as in 
the case of the State fire marshal and members of the 
board of health; sometimes the Governor acts in con¬ 
junction with the Executive Council, as in the case of the 
commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics and the 
industrial commissioner; sometimes he acts with the con¬ 
sent of the Senate, as in the case of the members of the 
board of control and State board of education; sometimes 
he acts in connection with another administrative body, 
as where he removes a mine inspector upon findings of 
the board of examiners of mine inspectors; and sometimes 
the Governor has nothing to do with the removal, as in 
the case of the commerce counsel who is removed by the 
railroad commissioners with the consent of the Senate, 
and the State librarian who is removed by the board of 
library trustees. 59 

These methods of removal, as set forth in the statutes, 
are nothing more than an illustration of removal for 
cause by executive order and are presumed to be con¬ 
ducted according to the forms of law, and in that sense 
they are judicial in their nature. Space will not permit a 
complete consideration of these provisions with their 
many variations in method and lack of uniformity in 
cause. (For a more detailed analysis of these various 
acts the reader is referred to the table in Mr. Peterson’s 
paper on the Selection of Public Officials in Iowa which 
appears in this series.) 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


37 


Removal Under the General Municipal Law.^- Prior 
to the adoption of the Constitution of 1857 the method of 
removal in the municipalities was provided through the 
agency of special charters. When, however, the Seventh 
General Assembly enacted the general incorporation act 
of 1858, a section was included providing a general meth¬ 
od of removing municipal officers. Under this act any 
member of the city council or any officer appointed by the 
council could be expelled or removed from office by a vote 
of two-thirds of the members-elect to that body. The 
council was given authority to provide by ordinance for 
the details of the procedure. 60 

This provision is also found in the Revision of 1860 
and in the Code of 1873 as a part of the municipal law. 
But with the Code of 1897 it disappears as a part of the 
municipal law and appears in the general removal law. 
The code commissioners said in their report that they 
found it necessary to rewrite the municipal law because 
of the conditions which had grown up over the division of 
cities into two classes: “Indeed it has been found that the 
distinction between these two classes, as fixed by the 
Code, has been practically ahrogated. ,,G1 Thus the 
municipal removal law was for the most part covered in 
the general statute. The commissioners did, however, 
incorporate a general section as to removal of appointive 
officers in the municipal law. By this section all ap¬ 
pointive officers are made subject to removal by the officer 
or body appointing, unless some other provision is found 
in the law. Moreover, as in the case of certain State 
officers, a number of the individual acts creating certain 
municipal officers contain expressed methods of removal 
in the acts themselves. Thus on account of the prevalence 
of special legislation in Iowa concerning municipalities, 


38 


APPLIED HISTORY 


it is impossible to lay down a general rule as to removals 
in the cities and towns of the State. Furthermore, since 
the scope of this paper makes impossible a consideration 
of individual acts, only an illustration will be given in 
passing. For instance, in cities having a board of police 
and fire commissioners the members of the board are sub¬ 
ject to removal by the mayor for cause with the consent of 
the council. Since the adoption of the Code of 1897 the 
General Assembly has seen fit to recast the section of the 
municipal law in regard to the removal of appointive 
officers, making it clear that such removals must be for 
cause. 62 

Removal Under the Civil Service Laws .— Iowa, like 
most of the other American Commonwealths, has never 
provided for a State-wide system of civil service, but the 
merit system was made a feature of the commission plan 
of government, which was adopted by the legislature in 
1907. Prior to this time the legislature had in 1902 cre¬ 
ated a board of police and fire commissioners for certain 
cities of the first class. This board was a civil service 
board for police and fire officials and employees other 
than the chiefs of the departments. By subsequent 
amendments and adjustments the legislation of 1902 has 
come to apply to all cities with over 20,000 inhabitants 
not operating under the commission form of government. 
There are five of these cities: Davenport, Dubuque, 
Clinton, Council Bluffs, and Waterloo. In these cities all 
members of the police and fire departments, including the 
chiefs, are subject to removal by the board for misconduct 
or failure to perform their duties. The law prescribes 
that the hearings before this board shall be of a judicial 
nature. 63 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


39 


There are eight cities of the State which have adopted 
the commission plan: Burlington, Cedar Rapids, Des 
Moines, Fort Dodge, Keokuk, Marshalltown, Sioux City, 
and Ottumwa. Here the method of removal by the civil 
service commission is more extensive than in the cities 
having a board of police and fire commissioners. All 
persons subject to civil service examination in these cities 
are subject to removal from office or employment by a 
majority vote of the civil service commission, for mis¬ 
conduct or failure to properly perform their duties, ac¬ 
cording to rules and regulations which are judicial in 
nature. 64 (See Mr. Van der Zee’s paper on The Merit 
System in Iowa which appears in this series.) 

SUMMARY REMOVAL: THE METHOD OF REMOVAL BY THE 
APPOINTING AUTHORITY 

As has been noted above, the power of summary re¬ 
moval has not been used to any great extent in Common¬ 
wealth government in the United States; and Iowa forms 
no exception to the rule. The Governor of Iowa possesses 
very little power of summary removal: he may remove 
the Adjutant General at will and several other minor of¬ 
ficials, such as members of the voting machine commis¬ 
sion, commissioners in other States, and notaries public. 
Scattered throughout the statutes of Iowa are to be found 
other instances of summary removal, like the case of the 
State geologist, who is subject to removal by the geolog¬ 
ical board at will, but such instances are not common. 65 

More instances of summary removal are to be found 
in local government than in State government — especial¬ 
ly in municipal government, where the mayor usually has 
the power to remove members of the police force at 
pleasure. Moreover, the Code of 1897 contains the fol- 


40 


APPLIED HISTORY 


lowing sweeping provision of summary removal: “All 
persons appointed to office in any city or town may be 
removed by the officer or body making the appointment, 
unless otherwise provided.” 66 The Thirty-second Gen¬ 
eral Assembly, however, made such removal possible only 
for cause; and the creation of a fire and police commission 
for certain cities has also largely limited the summary 
removal power of the mayor in five of the largest cities of 
the State. Thus summary removal is on the whole almost 
negligible in Iowa — except in the commission-governed 
cities where the commission has the power of summary 
removal over all city officers, it elects, including the clerk, 
the solicitor, the assessor, the treasurer, the auditor, the 
civil engineer, the city physician, the marshal, the market 
master, the street commissioner, and the library trus¬ 
tees. 67 Summary removal in Iowa stands in direct 
contrast to this method of removal in the Federal govern¬ 
ment. 

RECALL: THE METHOD OF REMOVAL BY THE PEOPLE 

The method of removal which has generally been es¬ 
tablished in recent years and which has attracted the 
widest attention is known as the recall — “a purely polit¬ 
ical device designed to provide for the discharge of a 
public official” 68 in the same manner in which he was 
elected. This modern device is a feature of the so-called 
Des Moines Plan of city government, itself an adaptation 
of the commission plan of government. Under this sys¬ 
tem any elective officer (that is, any one of the commis¬ 
sioners) of the city may be removed from office by popular 
vote. Moreover, this method is “cumulative and addi¬ 
tional to the methods heretofore provided by law.” 69 It 
is mentioned in this connection only as one of the methods 
in use in Iowa: it will be more fully discussed below. 


Ill 

THE RECALL IN THE UNITED STATES 

In the preceding chapter the recall in commission-gov¬ 
erned cities in Iowa was mentioned as the latest device 
for dispensing with the services of a public servant. 
This method of removal has found its way into the consti¬ 
tutions of eight of the American States as well as into the 
charters of a large number of local areas throughout the 
country. 

THE RECALL DEFINED 

The recall has been described in various ways. It has 
been defined as ‘ ‘ the guaranteed right of the people to dis¬ 
charge their public servants when these public servants 
cease to be satisfactory to them.” 70 A more recent 
writer has said that the recall is “a process by which the 
electors may discharge a public officer before the expira¬ 
tion” 71 of the term for which he was elected. Innumer¬ 
able statements of this kind could be quoted as explaining 
the modern recall without arriving at a very accurate 
conception of this method of removal. It is difficult to 
define an institution which is still in the formative stage 
and which may include within its scope the idea of the 
recall of elective, appointive, and judicial officers, as well 
as the recall of judicial decisions. A definition becomes 
even more difficult when the various kinds of recalls are 
taken into consideration: the summary recall, including 
the single removal; the short-term recall, voting to short¬ 
en the term of an officer; and the advisory recall, which 
extends the method to Federal officers. 


41 


42 


APPLIED HISTORY 


The ordinary modern recall, which when successful 
amounts to a summary removal, can he said to he a meth¬ 
od of removing public officers from office by popular vote 
when their services are no longer agreeable to the people: 
it may amount to a direct recall of the officer, or to a 
removal by the election of a successor, or the services of 
the official may be dispensed with by voting to shorten 
the term for which he was elected. In its usual form it 
partakes of the nature of the common motion used in 
deliberative bodies to “ elect a new officer in place of the 
present incumbent”. In fact for the purposes of making 
public officers responsive to the public will the recall 
views the electorate as a deliberative body. 

This definition does not include the advisory recall or 
the recall of judicial decisions. The advisory recall is an 
Arizona institution: it is an attempt to extend popular 
removal to United States Senators, Representatives, and 
Judges. By a preelection promise, which is a part of the 
system, the plan appears to be effective for elective of¬ 
ficers ; but for appointive officials it does not appear to be 
so good, although a system of pre-appointive promises is 
also worked out. The recall of judicial decisions is more 
properly considered as a phase of the referendum: it has 
to do with the construction of laws and is therefore con¬ 
cerned with the determination of public policy, rather 
than with the responsibility of those who are selected to 
execute the policies determined. Hence it does not come 
within the scope of this paper. 

THE THEORY OF THE RECALL 

Like the definitions of the recall the theoretical foun¬ 
dations of this popular instrument for responsible gov¬ 
ernment are not always stated in the same terms. A brief 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


43 


statement, however, of what appears to be the true 
theory, will be here attempted. The theory of the recall 
as a method of removal is different from the theory upon 
which impeachment and removal for cause are based. A 
great deal has been said about the application of the recall 
to appointive officers as distinct from elective officers — 
as if the method of selection had something to do with the 
character of the service rendered. Others have quibbled 
over the recall of judicial as distinct from the recall of 
non-judicial officers — as if the character of judicial ser¬ 
vice made responsibility unnecessary. 

Moreover, in all of these discussions sight has been 
lost of the fact that government is democratic in reality 
or only in name according to the “ degree of responsi¬ 
bility which the people can impose upon those whom they 
have chosen to carry on the work of government, whether 
that work be legislative, administrative, or judicial”; 72 
and it is immaterial whether these agents are selected by 
elections or indirectly by appointment. When this is kept 
in mind the theories of the recall in its various aspects do 
not vary but remain the same for elective and appointive, 
for judicial and non-judicial officers — that is, they are 
based upon the notion that in the people rests the author¬ 
ity to discharge their public servants at any time by a 
popular vote without proof of misconduct or maladminis¬ 
tration in office. In other words, the relation of employer 
and employee should exist between the people and their 
agents at all times, and the people should have the power 
to discharge at will. This is the relationship which exists 
between the President of the United States and most of 
the Federal officers; it is the relationship in which officers 
who are subject to summary removal serve; it is direct 
responsibility. 


44 


APPLIED HISTORY 


EXTENSION OF THE STATE-WIDE RECALL 

Since the adoption of a recall system for local officers 
by the voters of Los Angeles on December 1, 1902, this 
method of obtaining official responsibility has not only 
made a remarkable growth in the government of local 
areas, but it has also had a noteworthy development in 
State government. Oregon was the first State to estab¬ 
lish the recall as a feature of Commonwealth government, 
the people having ratified the amendment in 1908. By 
1911 the experience with the recall in local government 
led California to adopt a State-wide system. At the same 
time Arizona was seeking admission to the Union under a 
constitution with a recall provision which provoked a 
great deal of discussion in Congress upon the merits of 
the recall, its extension to the judiciary, and other aspects 
of the problem, and finally resulted in the passage of a 
statehood bill which was vetoed by President Taft as un¬ 
constitutional. Congress reconsidered the statehood bill, 
and after exempting judicial officers from the operation 
of the recall repassed the measure. Arizona, then, came 
into the Union in 1912 with a recall provision in its consti¬ 
tution applicable only to elective non-judicial officers. 
But the people of the new State, in November, 1912, 
amended the Constitution making the judiciary subject to 
the recall. Moreover, by the Revised Statutes of 1913, 
Representatives and Senators in Congress, as well as 
Federal Judges in Arizona were brought under the sys¬ 
tem by the adoption of the “advisory’’ recall. 

Following Arizona came Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, 
and Washington with constitutional amendments in 1912. 
Michigan was the last State to ratify a recall amendment, 
the provision having been adopted in 1913. In Nevada, 
Arizona, and Washington the provisions are so general 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


45 


as to include local officers along with the State officers; 
but in California and Colorado special provision is made 
for the recall in the local areas — it is left in the hands of 
the local legislative bodies until provision is made by 
general law for its operation. 

Thus eight States in all have within the last six years, 
by constitutional provision, authorized the removal of 
certain public officials by the people. In Idaho and Mich¬ 
igan, however, the amendments are simply mandates 
upon the legislature to pass legislation providing for the 
recall, with instructions as to certain features of the legis¬ 
lation. At the present writing the legislatures of both of 
these States have failed to pass the required legislation. 73 

ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-WIDE EECALL SYSTEMS 74 

Having noticed the nature and character of the recall 
as an instrument of democracy it is now proper to make a 
brief analysis of the constitutional provisions setting 
forth this unique method of removal. In this connection 
only the essential features will he described, and usually 
no reference will be made to the statutory provisions that 
may exist in addition to the constitutional sections of the 
various States. 

The extent of the application of the recall varies in the 
different States, the language of the constitutions upon 
this point being somewhat confusing. In some States it 
is clear that only elective officers are subject to this meth¬ 
od of removal; in others “every public officer of the 
state” is subject to recall “by the qualified voters of the 
district from which he is elected”; while in Colorado 
provision is made for the recall of all elective officers, but 
the definition of an elective officer is very confusing. By 
a careful analysis of the recall provisions it appears that 


46 


APPLIED HISTORY 


in all of the States only elected officers are subject to this 
method of removal. Moreover, in three of the States a 
distinction is made in the character of the service ren¬ 
dered— that is to say, Idaho, Washington, and Michigan 
exempt judges from recall. The other five States, how¬ 
ever, make no such distinction and extend the system to 
all elective officers, irrespective of the character of the 
service rendered by them. 

The recall in its ordinary form consists of two proc¬ 
esses : the petition and the election. In States having the 
recall as a method of removal any citizen or group of 
citizens may initiate the process by filing a petition as 
provided by law. All such petitions must contain the 
signatures of a certain percentage of the voters. In all 
of the States but California and Idaho the constitutions 
fix twenty-five percent as the required number for State 
officers. In California only twelve percent is required 
on petitions for the removal of State officers elected at 
large; while twenty percent is required where the officer 
to be recalled is elected from a district in the State. 
Idaho fixes no percentage in the constitution but leaves 
the matter to the legislature. The basis of the percentage 
in recall petitions varies considerably more than the 
actual percentage in the different systems. In Michigan 
the basis of percentage is the vote cast at the last pre¬ 
ceding election for Governor. Oregon and Nevada pro¬ 
vide that the vote cast at the last preceding election for 
Justice of Supreme Court shall be the basis. The other 
States, with the exception of Idaho, fix the basis of per¬ 
centage as the total number of votes cast for all candi¬ 
dates for the office from which the petition seeks to recall 
the incumbent — which seems, indeed, to be the most 
reasonable basis. 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


47 


Another essential feature of the recall petition is its 
contents. In five of the States the petition must demand 
the recall of the incumbent, or the election of a successor. 
The petition must usually contain a statement of the 
grounds for the removal. Some of the States limit the 
statement of cause to two hundred words. But this must 
not lead the reader to think that the recall is a method of 
removal for cause; for the recall is a method of summary 
removal, and the people are usually the exclusive judges 
of the “legality, reasonableness, and sufficiency” of the 
grounds stated in the petition. Moreover, their judgment 
is generally not subject to review by the courts. In 
Washington, however, the recall differs from that in the 
other States. There the recall is, as a matter of fact, a 
system of removal for cause, since the petition must re¬ 
cite the commission of some “act or acts of malfeasance 
or misfeasance .... in office”, and the constitu¬ 
tion does not expressly exempt the decision of the people 
from judicial review. 

After a petition has been properly drawn and circu¬ 
lated the next step to be taken is its filing with the 
proper officer. All of the States which have really pro¬ 
vided machinery for the recall, with the exception of 
California and Arizona, require the filing of a recall peti¬ 
tion with the same official with whom a petition for nom¬ 
ination for that particular office is filed. In case of State 
officers this is usually the Secretary of State. The Cali¬ 
fornia system requires the filing of the petition with the 
clerk or registrar of voters in the various local areas of 
the State. This local officer then certifies the petition to 
the Secretary of State who transmits it to the Governor. 
Under the Constitution of Arizona it is expressly pro¬ 
vided that petitions for the recall of State officers shall be 


48 


APPLIED HISTORY 


filed with the Secretary of State. In Colorado the peti¬ 
tion is also certified to the Governor. The effect of filing 
a recall petition is to call an election for the purposes set 
forth in the petition. Usually the officer with whom the 
petition is filed sets the date of the election, but in Cali¬ 
fornia and Colorado the Governor issues the call for the 
election. Such in general are the main features of the 
recall petition as found in the United States. 

The second process in the ordinary machinery of the 
recall is the election. The time of holding a recall election 
is perhaps the most important feature of the process, as 
election regulations are already well established in all of 
the States. Among the State-wide systems there is the 
greatest variety of provisions concerning time of recall 
elections, nearly every State having a different arrange¬ 
ment but all using the special election. Nevada and 
Oregon require the election to be held within twenty days 
after an election is ordered, which must take place within 
five days after the petition is filed; in Arizona it is not 
less than twenty nor more than thirty days after the elec¬ 
tion is ordered, which is also within five days after the 
filing of the petition; California makes the election neces¬ 
sary in not less than sixty days nor more than eighty days 
after certification to the Secretary of State; Washington 
provides that a special election shall be called as set forth 
in the general election laws of the State; Colorado has 
perhaps the best provision, for the Constitution provides 
that a special election shall be held in not less than thirty 
nor more than sixty days from date of certification to the 
Governor unless a general election falls within ninety 
days, in which case the recall election shall be held at any 
time. 

Of course in most of the States a recall election may 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


49 


be avoided, even after a petition has been filed, by the 
resignation of the official against whom the petition is 
filed. In some States there is a time limit in which such 
resignation must be filed. Colorado and Arizona require 
the resignation to be presented within five days after the 
petition is filed. But in California a recall election can 
not be avoided by resignation. Under this plan, in case of 
resignation the office is filled as provided by law until the 
result of the recall election is ascertained. 

Furthermore, an examination of the different systems 
shows that the nature of the recall election varies. A 
majority of the States make the election one for the pur¬ 
pose of selecting a successor to the incumbent, but in 
California and Colorado the electorate vote on both the 
proposition of recalling the incumbent and upon a suc¬ 
cessor to the incumbent. The Constitution of Washing¬ 
ton, however, is not clear in regard to the nature of the 
election: it would seem that the electorate votes merely 
on the question of removal. When the recall is an elec¬ 
tion to select a successor to the incumbent usually the 
incumbent may be a candidate for reelection along with 
other candidates who are properly nominated. In Cali¬ 
fornia and Colorado, however, there is no necessity for 
the incumbent to be a candidate as a direct vote is taken 
on the question of removal. 

In all of the States which have completed the ma¬ 
chinery of the recall the ballot not only contains the name 
of the candidates for the office, but also a printed state¬ 
ment of generally not over two hundred words setting 
forth the reasons for the removal and two hundred words 
giving the officer’s justification of his course of conduct. 
Colorado and California allow the officer three hundred 
words for his justification. Usually at a recall election 


4 


50 


APPLIED HISTORY 


the person having the largest number of votes — it may 
be the incumbent himself — is elected and continues to 
serve the remainder of the term. In Colorado and Cali¬ 
fornia, however, the officer must be recalled by a majority 
vote and then the candidate receiving the highest number 
of votes is considered as elected to fill the vacancy created 
by the recall. 

The States as a whole place certain limitations upon 
the use of the recall. Generally a recall petition can not 
be filed until the officer has been in office for at least six 
months — with the exception of legislators who are sub¬ 
ject to removal after from five to ten days of service in 
the first session of the legislature to which they are elect¬ 
ed. There are also limitations upon the use of the recall 
after one unsuccessful attempt. In Arizona, Nevada, and 
Oregon the petitioners must pay the expense of the first 
recall election before they can file a second recall petition. 
In California a second petition can not be filed within six 
months and in Colorado the second petition must be 
signed by at least fifty percent of the voters. 

An examination of all of the constitutional provisions 
in the eight States having the State-wide system shows 
that the California and Colorado systems are the most 
elaborate. The recall provisions are declared by the con¬ 
stitutions to be self-executory, although the people and 
the legislature are given authority to supplement the 
constitutional provisions. This is the case also in 
Oregon. But in the other five States the constitutions 
make it mandatory upon the legislature to pass additional 
legislation. The constitutions of Idaho and Michigan set 
forth none of the machinery of the recall, but leave most 
of the features to the discretion of the legislature. 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


51 


COMPARISON OF THE IOWA RECALL WITH THE STATE-WIDE 
SYSTEMS 

Although the Iowa recall is limited to elective officers 
in commission-governed cities, yet the plan is very sim¬ 
ilar to the State-wide systems above analyzed. Under the 
Des Moines Plan only elective officers — namely, the com¬ 
missioners — are subject to this method of removal. In 
these commission-governed cities the recall petition must 
be signed by at least twenty-five percent of the electorate; 
but only those entitled to vote for a successor may sign 
the petition. The basis of the percentage is the total vote 
cast for all candidates for the office of mayor at the last 
preceding general municipal election. As in the most 
common form of the State-wide systems, the petition 
must demand an election of a successor to the incumbent 
and contain a general statement of the grounds for the 
removal. After the petition has been circulated it is filed 
with the city clerk. If the petition is found sufficient it is 
submitted within ten days to the council. The council 
then orders an election to be held in not less than thirty 
nor more than forty days after certification by the clerk. 
The Iowa law varies from the ordinary provisions of the 
State-wide systems examined in the preceding sections in 
that no provision is made for the avoidance of a recall 
election after a petition has been filed — that is, the stat¬ 
ute says nothing about the resignation of the officer, or the 
effect of such resignation after a petition has been filed. 

The second process in the machinery of the recall in 
Iowa as used in the commission-governed cities is also 
similar to that found in the State systems. The election 
is of the usual nature, namely, an election to select a suc¬ 
cessor to the incumbent; the officer himself becomes a 
candidate unless he otherwise requests; the person who 


52 


APPLIED HISTORY 


receives the highest number of votes finishes the unex¬ 
pired term; and there is no provision for a statement of 
the cause of removal on the ballot or of the officer’s justi¬ 
fication. Moreover, there are no expressed limitations 
upon the use of the recall in Iowa. 

Thus it is apparent that the Iowa recall system com¬ 
pares favorably in its provisions with the more compre¬ 
hensive State systems. No doubt there are plenty of 
grounds for improvement in the Iowa law, but should the 
State see fit to extend this novel plan of removal, the 
recall law of the commission-governed cities will furnish 
a good starting point as well as an example for constitu¬ 
tional amendment. 


IV 

SUGGESTIONS FOR A RECALL SYSTEM IN IOWA 

An examination of the more important features of the 
various recall systems of the United States, together with 
the recall provisions of the Iowa commission government 
law, suggests certain conclusions as to the provisions 
which should be incorporated in any plan for a State¬ 
wide application of the recall. If Iowa is to extend the 
method of removal which has been established for com¬ 
mission-governed cities to other officers of the State and 
thereby align this Commonwealth with the more progres¬ 
sive western States, the following essential features 
should be included:— 

First. The State-wide application of the recall should 
be made by constitutional amendment; and the provisions 
of the Constitution should be so cast as to include all of¬ 
ficers, State and local, who it is deemed should be made 
subject to the recall. 

Second. This method of removal should be limited to 
elective officials where the State provides a comprehensive 
system of summary removal. That is to say, if both the 
executive authority and the appointing authority are 
vested throughout the State and local governments with 
the power of summary removal irrespective of the tenure 
of office, then the recall is unnecessary for the removal of 
appointive officials as these officers can be reached in an 
effective manner through the elective officials. Indeed, it 
would seem that a comprehensive plan of summary re- 


53 


54 


APPLIED HISTORY 


moval, together with a State-wide system of the recall for 
elective officers would be the most practical arrangement 
that could be made in the light of past experiences, if in¬ 
deed it is not the ideal. To be sure, there is no good 
reason in theory why appointive officers should not be 
subject to the recall; but there is no reason for extending 
this method of removal to appointive officials merely to 
satisfy a theory, when the practical aspects of the prob¬ 
lem do not warrant it. 

Third. No distinction need be made in regard to the 
character of the public service, that is, between judicial 
and non-judicial service. If judges are elected they 
should be subject to the recall: if they are appointed, they 
should be responsible to the appointing authority. 

Fourth. The Constitution should not make the circu¬ 
lation of a recall petition too easy or too difficult. 
Twenty-five percent of the electorate is perhaps as rea¬ 
sonable a requirement as can be made for the present. 
The fairest basis of percentage would seem to be the total 
vote cast at the last preceding election for all candidates 
for the office which the incumbent holds. For the infor¬ 
mation of the signers the petition should contain a brief 
statement of the reasons for demanding the removal. 
Adequate provisions should also be worked out regulating 
the filing and canvassing of recall petitions. 

Fifth. The election should be held as soon as expedi¬ 
ent ; and yet it is important that the electorate should be 
given a reasonable time in which to inform itself concern¬ 
ing the situation. It is suggested that the recall election 
should take place in not less than twenty nor more than 
thirty days after the sufficiency of the petition has been 
ascertained. 

Sixth. The election should partake of the nature of a 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


55 


summary removal by the process of electing a successor 
to the incumbent. The cumbersome method provided in 
Colorado and California seems useless. The printing of 
the causes for the removal and the officer’s justification 
likewise seem unnecessary and impracticable since the 
ordinary voter will have determined the merits of the case 
before he enters the booth. The officer should justify his 
conduct by a personal appeal to the electorate or through 
the medium of the newspapers. 

Seventh. Provision should be made for stopping the 
machinery of the recall in case the officer resigns before 
the election. The purpose of the recall is to terminate an 
official relation which is no longer agreeable to the people; 
and so, when this has been accomplished in another way 
there is no reason for proceeding with the recall ma¬ 
chinery merely for the purpose of selecting a successor, 
as the law has already provided for the filling of such 
vacancies. 

Eighth. Some limitations must be imposed upon the 
use of the recall. Prohibiting its use until after six 
months of official service, except in the case of legislators, 
is a good limitation. Requiring a higher percentage for a 
second recall petition than for the first petition is another 
good limitation — being better than requiring the signers 
of the second petition to pay the expenses of the first 
election. 

Ninth. The constitutional provision establishing the 
recall should be self-executory, although the legislature 
and the people should have the power to pass supple¬ 
mentary legislation. 

Tenth. The existing methods of removal, impeach¬ 
ment and removal for cause, should be retained for the 
present and operated in connection with the system here 


56 


APPLIED HISTORY 


suggested. To be sure, some of the existing provisions 
have atrophied and others have never been more than 
mere paper provisions; but political experience itself will 
care for these in the future as it has in the past. 


NOTES AND REFERENCES 








NOTES AND REFERENCES 


1 Butler vs, Pennsylvania, 10 Howard (United States) 402; Ashley’s 
Removal of Public Officials in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of Amer¬ 
ican Government, Yol. Ill, pp. 177, 178. 

2 Constitution of the United States, Art. I, Sec. 2, Art. I, Sec. 3, Art. II, 
Sec. 4; Goodnow’s Principles of the Administrative Law of the United 
States, pp. 458-460. 

3 Constitution of the United States, Art. II, Sec. 4. 

4 Shepardson’s Impeachment in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of 
American Government, Yol. II, pp. 149, 150; Ray’s An Introduction to 
Political Parties and Practical Politics, pp. 370, 371; Goodnow’s Principles 
of the Administrative Law of the United States, pp. 462, 463. 

s Goodnow’s Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States, 
p. 460; Shepardson’s Impeachment in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of 
American Government, Yol. II, pp. 149-151. 

« Parsons vs. United States, 167 United States 324; State vs. Chatburn, 
63 Iowa 659; Ex parte Hennen, 13 Peters, 230; Eighth Biennial Report of 
the Attorney General, pp. 58-69, in the Iowa Legislative Documents, 1911, 
Yol. I. 

7 Goodnow’s Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States, 
pp. 76, 77; Parsons vs. United States, 167 United States 324. 

s Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, pp. 58-69, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I; Horack’s Government of Iowa, p. 79. 

0 Ashley’s Removal of Public Officials in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclo¬ 
pedia of American Government, Yol. Ill, p. 179; Goodnow’s Principles of 
the Administrative Law of the United States, pp. 313-315. 

10 Ray’s An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics, p. 
371; Ashley’s Removal of Public Officials in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclo¬ 
pedia of American Government, Yol. Ill, p. 178. 

11 Compare Constitution of Iowa, 1844, Art. IY, Secs. 20, 21, with Consti¬ 
tution of Iowa, 1846, Art. IV, Secs. 19, 20. 

12 Constitution of Iowa, 1846, Art. IY, Sec. 20. 


59 


60 


APPLIED HISTORY 


13 Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. IV, See. 20. 

14 Eighth Biennial Beport of the Attorney General, p. 69, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I. 

is Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. Ill, Secs. 9, 20. 

16 Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. Ill, Sec. 19. 

17 Constitution of Iowa, 1857, Art. Ill, Sec. 20; Code of 1851, Sec. 397. 

is Code of 1851, Secs. 398-402. 

19 Code of 1851, Secs. 404-410. 

20 Compare Code of 1851, Title IV, Chs. 31, 32, and Bevision of 1860, 
Title IV, Chs. 38, 39. 

21 Code of 1873, Title V, Ch. 7. 

22 Code of 1897, Sec. 1251. 

23 State vs. Welsh, 109 Iowa 19, at 25. 

24 State vs. Meek, 148 Iowa 671. 

25 Code of 1897, Sec. 1252. 

26 Code of 1897, Sec. 1252. 

27 Seventh Biennial Beport of the Attorney General, pp. 33-35, in the 
Iowa Legislative Documents, 1909, Vol. III. 

28 Code of 1897, Secs. 1252-1254. 

20 Code of 1897, Sec. 1258. 

so Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 78; Laws of Iowa, 1911, Ch. 60; Message of 
the Governor, p. 15, in the Iowa Legislative Documents, 1909, Vol. I; 
Seventh Biennial Beport of the Attorney General, p. 15, in the Iowa Legis¬ 
lative Documents, 1909, Vol. Ill; Senate File No. 8 of the 33rd General As¬ 
sembly; Journal of the Senate, 1909, pp. 524, 525. 

si Compare Code of 1897, Title VI, Ch. 8 with Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 
78; Eighth Biennial Beport of the Attorney General, p. 35, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1909, Vol. Ill; State vs. Welsh, 109 Iowa 19. 

32 Iowa City Bepublican, Thursday, February 19, 1914. 

33 State vs. Henderson, 145 Iowa 657. 

34 Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 78. 

35 Eighth Biennial Beport of the Attorney General, p. 17, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Vol. I. 


REMOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 


61 


36 Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, pp. 17, 18, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I; State vs. Henderson, 145 Iowa 657. 

37 Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 18, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I. 

38 Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, pp. 18, 19, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I. 

39 Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 20, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I; State vs. Hospers, 147 Iowa 712. 

40 Eighth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 20, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I. 

41 Ninth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 12, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1913, Yol. III. 

42 Ninth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 12, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1913, Yol. III. 

43 Ninth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 12, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1913, Yol. III. 

44 See Code of 1851, Secs. 924-936. 

45 Laws of Iowa, 1857, Ch. 157, Sec. 5. 

46 Code of 1897, Sec. 2428. 

47 Code of 1897, Sec. 5099. 

48 Compare Laws of Iowa, 1894, Ch. 62, Sec. 15, with Code of 1897, Sec. 
2446. 

49 Seventh Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 33, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1909, Yol. III. 

50 Seventh Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 34, in the Iowa 
Legislative Documents, 1909, Yol. III. 

si Brown vs. Duffus, 66 Iowa 193. 

52 Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 160. 

53 Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 160. 

54 Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 160. 

55 Compare Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 160, with Revision of 1860, Secs. 
46-54; Code of 1873, Secs. 759-765; Code Commissioners Report, 1873, Title 
Y, Ch.* 7, p. 19; Code of 1897, Title YI, Ch. 9. 

56 Register and Leader, Sunday, April 11, 1909; Eighth Biennial Report 


62 


APPLIED HISTORY 


of the Attorney General, p. 65, in the Iowa Legislative Documents, 1911, 
Yol. I; Message of the Governor in the House Journal, 1909, pp. 1294, 1295. 

57 Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 77. 

58 Compare Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 77, with Senate File No. 418 of the 
33rd General Assembly, and with Eighth Biennial Beport of the Attorney 
General, p. 65, in the Iowa Legislative Documents, 1911, Yol. I. 

59 See the table in Mr. Peterson’s paper on the Selection of Public Of¬ 
ficials in Iowa which appears in this series. 

so Laws of Iowa, 1858, Ch. 157, Sec. 71. 

61 Beport of the Code Commission to Accompany the Code as reported to 
the Twenty-sixth General Assembly, p. 26. 

62 Code Supplement, 1907, Secs. 657, 679-e. 

63 Laws of Iowa, 1902, Ch. 31; Laws of Iowa, 1907, Ch. 29; Laws of Iowa, 
1911, Ch. 33. 

64 Laws of Iowa, 1911, Ch. 54. 

65 See the table in Mr. Peterson’s paper on the Selection of Public Of¬ 
ficials in Iowa which appears in this series. 

66 Code of 1897, Sec. 657. 

67 Code Supplement, 1907, Sec. 1056-a26; Laws of Iowa, 1909, Ch. 64, 
Sec. 8. 

68 Kettleborough’s Bemoval of Public Officers in the American Political 
Science Beview, Yol. VIII, p. 623. 

69 Code Supplement, 1907, Sec. 1056-a 36. 

70 Wilcox’s Government by All the People, p. 167. 

71 Haynes’s Becall in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of American 
Government, Yol. Ill, p. 157. 

72 Ray’s An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics, p. 
368. 

73 Haynes’s Becall in McLaughlin and Hart’s Cyclopedia of American 
Government, Yol. Ill, pp. 157-159. 

74 The material for this section was taken from the following sources: 
Constitution of Oregon, Art. II, Sec. 18; Constitution of California, Art. 
XXIII; Constitution of Arizona, Art. VIII; Constitution of Colorado, Art. 
XXI; Constitution of Nevada, Art. II, Sec. 9; Constitution of Idaho, 
Art. VI, Sec. 6; Constitution of Washington, Art. I, Secs. 33, 34; Constitu¬ 
tion of Michigan, Art. Ill, Sec. 8. 


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